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United States Savings Bonds As an Estate Planning Item
Warren L. Mengis'
Our Civil Code is the legal monarch over all things it surveys. It
is both subject and object, creator and created, preserver and preserved.
In fact, it is legally Louisiana's Ark of the Covenant. However, for the
better preservation of the law, we must put an end to the idolatry of
precedent worship of decisions that are not in accord with the views and
aspirations of the present and refuse to adopt the legal abstractions of
other jurisdictions. We should more closely safeguard our own codal
articles as to the devolution of property, in order to prevent our being
drawn into the vortex of federal governmental regulations. There
should be less focusing on the words of judges, and we should become
imbued with the spirit of "what is right is right."'
The above words are taken from the opinion in Succession of Gladney,2
written by Justice Moise in 1953, almost ten years prior to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Free v. Bland.3 The year prior to the decision in
Succession of Gladney, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Winsburg v.
Winsburg, 4 wherein Justice McCaleb, bowing to the supremacy of federal
regulations, concluded that the United States savings bond plan established an
additional method of disposing of property mortis causa and that this plan had
been superimposed on the forms prescribed for such dispositions by our Civil
Code. The United States savings bonds in question in Winsburg were beneficia-
ry bonds, payable on death to the alternate owner. Justice McCaleb went on to
say, however, that it does not follow that the contract between the United States
government and the bondholders may be employed to nullify the Louisiana laws
applicable to the devolution of property or to confer on the donees greater rights
than they would have had if the devise had been in the form of a last will and
testament.5
There was not, in our opinion, any intention to interfere with the
enforcement of the laws of descent and distribution of the various
States. Therefore, forasmuch as the payment on death clause contained
in such bonds must be considered as a valid appendage to our laws
respecting the forms for dispositions mortis causa, it appears logical to
apply all provisions pertaining to testamentary dispositions, except those
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1. Succession of Gladney, 223 La. 949, 954, 67 So. 2d 547, 548 (1953).
2. 223 La. 949, 67 So. 2d 547 (1953).
3. 369 U.S. 663, 82 S. Ct. 1089 (1962).
4. 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
5. Id. at 404-05, 56 So. 2d at 731-32.
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dealing with forms, in determining rights and liabilities under such a
devise.6
Indeed, Justice McCaleb continued, it seems manifest that the regulations of the
Treasury Department for the payment of savings bonds were designed solely to
facilitate the Government. By providing a simple method for the liquidation of
these obligations, the Government would not be subjected to the inconvenience and
delays attendant to the settlement of conflicting or disputed claims.
The lip service given to the federal regulations continued in the jurisprudence
down to Free v. Bland, but only with respect to the necessity to deliver the bonds
to the co-owner or the beneficiary. All of the strings of the Civil Code, such as
reduction, collation, 8 and community property, remained attached.
The Supreme Court of the United States made it quite plain in Free v. Bland,9
however, that it was not concerned with the relative importance of state law. In
fact, the purpose of the treasury regulations is to establish the right of survivorship
regardless of local state law. The Court noted that a majority of the states which
had considered the problem recognized that the Federal Supremacy Clause'0
controlled.
Free v. Bland involved the community property law of Texas. During the
marriage, Mr. Free had used community property to purchase several series "E"
and series "F"' bonds which were made payable to Mr. or Mrs. Free. Upon Mrs.
Free's death, a controversy arose between Mr. Free, who claimed the exclusive
ownership of the bonds by virtue of treasury regulations, and Mrs. Free's son from
a previous marriage. The son, as the principal beneficiary under his mother's will,
claimed an interest in the bonds by virtue of the state community property laws."
The Court, in one of its plainest pronouncements, said: "One of the inducements
selected by the Treasury is the survivorship provision, a convenient method of
avoiding complicated probate proceedings."' 12 The requirement of making the
bondholder account to the son for half the value of the bonds rendered the title to
the bonds meaningless. This, according to the Court, interfered with the legitimate
exercise of the power of the federal government to borrow money.
After the decision in Free v. Bland, the next United States Supreme Court
decision of importance was Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,13 which introduced the fraud
6. Id. at 405, 56 So. 2d at 732.
7. Succession of Mulqueeny, 248 La. 659, 181 So. 2d 384 (1966); Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La.
962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953); Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947); Succession
of Land, 212 La. 103, 31 So. 2d 609 (1947); Succession of Mulqueeny, 156 So. 2d 317 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963).
8. But see Osterland v. Gates, 400 So. 2d 653 (La. 1981), which seems to eliminate the collation
requirement.
9. 369 U.S. 663, 667-68, 82 S. Ct. 1089, 1093 (1962).
10. U.S. Con~t. art. V1, cl. 2.
i 1. Free, 369 U.S. at 664-65, 82 S. Ct. at 1091.
12. Id. at 669, 82 S. Ct. at 1093.
13. 376 U.S. 306, 84 S. Ct. 742 (1964).
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element into the equation. In Yiatchos, the husband used community property
to purchase beneficiary bonds, which were payable upon his death. He named
his brother the beneficiary owner of the bonds. The Court recognized that the
wife in a community property state has a vested interest in her half of the
property and the fraudulent disposition of that property by the other partner of
the community would serve to bar the title of the beneficiary owner. Whether
or not there is fraud, however, must be determined as a matter of federal law;
but, in applying the federal standard, state law would guide the court insofar as
the widow's property interest, created by state law, is concerned.14  The
Yiatchos Court was not certain from an examination of the record that the wife
had not consented or ratified the purchase of the bonds nor could the Court
determine whether there was sufficient property left by the husband, other than
the bonds, to make up the wife's one-half. The Court, therefore, remanded the
case for a determination of these issues.
After Free and Yiatchos, it appeared settled under the Supremacy Clause that
state law concerns about descent and distribution were subordinate to the policies
and regulations of the Federal government. Surprisingly enough, however,
despite the plain language of Free v. Bland,5 Louisiana continued along the
minority view where the interests of forced heirs were at stake.' The courts
of appeal decided Succession of Videau,"7 Succession of Guerre,8 and
Fontenot v. Fontenot.9 Each of these cases clearly held that although the
bonds themselves, whether co-owner or beneficiary, must be delivered to the co-
owner or the beneficiary, the value of the decedent's community interest in the
bonds had to be included in the Article 1505 calculation of the forced portion. 20
In Succession of Guerre, for example, the court went to great lengths to try
to distinguish Free v. Bland. Although recognizing forced heirs have no vested
right, which a wife would have in connection with community property in
Louisiana, the court stated that the forced heir, nevertheless, has very important
property rights protected by the Constitution of Louisiana. The court held the
forced heir, therefore, has a right to proceed according to law in an action for
reduction of an excessive donation against a surviving co-owner or beneficiary
14. Id. at 309, 84 S. Ct. at 745.
15. The Free Court interpreted the Supremacy Clause such that "any state law, however clearly
within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to Federal law, must
yield." Free, 369 U.S. at 666, 82 S. Ct. at 1092. Elaborating, Chief Justice Warren continued:
"[Tihe purpose of [Treasury regulations governing United States savings bonds issued pursuant to
Article I, section 8. clause 2 of the Constitution] is to establish the right of survivorship regardless
of local state law .... " Id. at 668, 82 S. Ct. at 1093. Thus, the language of Free does not appear
to limit that decision's sweep to state community property law.
16. Alfred M. Posner, Comment, United States Savings Bonds-Ownership and State Inheritance
Taxes, 8 La. L. Rev. 571 (1948).
17. 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 250 La. 920, 199 So. 2d 922 (1967).
18. 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 250 La. 928, 199 So. 2d 926 (1967).
19. 399 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 342 So. 2d 217 (1977).
20. La. Civ. Code art. 1505.
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of the bonds. The forced heir would proceed in the same manner as if an equal
amount of money had been given to them (the bondholders) through the medium
of a donation inter vivos.21 The Louisiana Supreme Court refused writs in both
Guerre and Videau.
It thus seemed, at least in the perspective of a Louisiana lawyer, the spouse's
vested community property interest took a back seat to the non-vested property
right of the forced heir. In Guerre, the court had said there is no right more
sacred in .our laws than the right of a forced heir to inherit no less than a fixed
minimum, which we call the legitime. 2' But, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
in the 1956 case of Messersmith v. Messersmith23 had said "[tihere is nothing
more fundamental in our law than the rule of property which declares that this
community is a partnership in which the husband and wife own equal shares,
their title thereto vesting at the very instant such property is acquired."'  Why,
then, would the less significant "property right" of the forced heir be more
important than the "vested interest" of the partner in the community?
Calling into further doubt the strength of the Louisiana courts of appeal
decisions is the 1981 United States Supreme Court decision, Ridgway v.
Ridgway.25 Ridgway addressed the beneficiary designation of a life insurance
policy issued pursuant to the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act of 196526
and, specifically, whether the regulations adopted pursuant to that act would
prevail over a constructive trust imposed by a state court decree. The Court held
the federal act, along with the regulations adopted pursuant thereto, prevailed
over and displaced the inconsistent state law. The Court further stated the right
to name the beneficiary or change the beneficiary, even without the consent of
the presently named beneficiary, was a personal right belonging to the insured
member alone. It was not a shared asset subject to the interest of another as was
the community property in Yiatchos, in which the wife had a distinct vested
community interest." That the Court stressed Yiatchos was distinguishable
because of the vested interest present in Yiatchos makes the decisions in Guerre,
Videau, and Fontenot even more dubious in so far as they protect the non-vested
property right of forced heirs.
This brings us, finally, to Succession of Harrell,28 which was decided by
the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in 1993. In Harrell, the husband
purchased United States savings bonds in the amount of $154,000, payable to
himself or to his wife. Mrs. Harrell had been interdicted and a curator and
21. Guerre, 197 So. 2d at 743-45.
22. Id. at 743.
23. 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956).
24. Id. at 506, 86 So. 2d at 173 (citations omitted).
25. 454 U.S. 46, 102 S. Ct. 49 (1981). See Charles C. Coffee, Note, Ridgway v. Ridgway:
Forced Heirship's Maine Connection, 28 Loy. L. Rev. 619 (1982).
26. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1976 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
27. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 59-60, 102 S. Ct. at 57.
28. 622 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
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undercurator had been appointed to administer her estate. Upon the death of Mr.
Harrell, the executor of his estate included a one-half interest in the bonds,
$77,137, in the descriptive list of his estate. The bonds, physically, were given
to Mrs. Harrell's curator. The homologation of the detailed descriptive list was
opposed on two grounds, one of which was that Mrs. Harrell was entitled to full
ownership of the savings bonds without any obligation to reimburse her
husband's succession.29 There was no doubt the bonds had been purchased
with community funds and, accordingly, the executor of Mr. Harrell's succession
contended that one-half of the value of those bonds should be included in the
estate.
Surprisingly, the court concluded otherwise, holding Free v. Bland had
overruled Slater v. Culpepper3° and the other cases cited by the executor of Mr.
Harrell's succession. Succession of Videau and Succession of Guerre did not
control because no forced heirs were involved in Succession of Harrell.3' The
court also concluded that there was no fraud in what was done between Mr. and
Mrs. Harrell and that they had clearly intended the bonds to go to the surviving
spouse, free of legal entanglements. Toward the end of the opinion the court
stated:
In the instant case the savings bonds are of such a type that vest
full and complete ownership in the surviving co-owner spouse. There
is no indication of fraud or deprivation of property rights to Mr.
Harrell's estate or any forced heirs. The Harrells clearly wanted the
bonds to go to the surviving spouse with no legal entanglements.
3 2
This is similar to the language in Free v. Bland that one of the inducements
selected by the Treasury is the survivorship provision, a convenient method of
avoiding complicated probate proceedings. But what are the ramifications of this
holding? Is a Louisiana inheritance tax'due by the donee? Suppose that there
were creditors of Mr. Harrell's succession who might go unpaid if the account
receivable for one-half the bonds is eliminated?
First, consider the tax consequences. In United States v. Chandler,3 the
United States Supreme Court held that co-owner bonds, which had actually been
given by the decedent, Mary Baum, during her lifetime to her granddaughters but
which had not been cashed, nor the payee changed, were still part of the federil
estate of Mrs. Baum. The Court concluded the delivery of the bonds to the
granddaughters, even with donative intent, was not sufficient to remove the value
of the bonds from the decedent's gross estate.34 Presumably then, if the Harrell
29. Id. at 254.
30. 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953).
31. Harrell, 622 So. 2d at 255-56.
32. Id. at 256.
33. 410 U.S. 257, 93 S. Ct. 880 (1973).
34. Id. at 260-61, 93 S. Ct. at 882.
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succession had been subject to federal estate taxes, the one-half that was Mr.
Harrell's community interest would be included in the computation of federal
estate taxes.
On the other hand, one should not forget the two Louisiana cases dealing
with inheritance taxes, Succession of Tanner 5 and Succession of Raborn.3 6
Tanner involved co-owner United States savings bonds and Raborn involved
beneficiary United States savings bonds. The Louisiana Inheritance Tax statute
provides that "the tax shall be imposed with respect to all property of every
nature and kind included or embraced in any inheritance legacy or donation or
gift made in contemplation of death.,' 37 The court in Raborn concluded the
payments on death bonds were made in contemplation of death and, therefore,
a Louisiana inheritance tax was appropriate. The court indicated the decision in
Succession of Tanner held to the contrary, but because the Tanner court was
divided, that decision was not persuasive. 38 Actually, the cases are different in
that one was a co-owner bond and the other was a beneficiary bond.'9
Second, what are the consequences for a creditor? Suppose the deceased has
put virtually his entire estate in "either/or" bonds, who is to pay the funeral
expenses? Would the creditor be like Farm Credit Bank in Succession of
Sweeney,4 0 wherein the court concluded that life insurance payable to the estate
of the deceased was not available to pay the debts of the deceased? On the other
hand, if the debt was incurred prior to the death of the deceased, the holding in
Yiatchos would probably protect the creditor if it could find out who had the
bonds. But suppose there was absolutely no fraud, that things simply went sour
financially and the only assets left were the bonds. No succession would be
opened and it would be most unlikely for anyone to come forward and surrender
the bonds.
Where does all this bring us? What is the succession attorney supposed to
do when United States savings bonds, either co-owner or beneficiary, are found
in the safety deposit box of the decedent? There is no doubt at all that the bonds
themselves must be delivered to the co-owner or the beneficiary; but, suppose
there are forced heirs? Or, suppose there is a surviving spouse and the bonds,
which were purchased with community property, have to be delivered to a
stranger to the community? Should the attorney include the value of the bonds
in the descriptive list or one-half of their value in community property if he
concludes, under the holding in Succession of Harrell, that where only a
community property interest is involved he does not have to? Would this compel
him to the conclusion that he does not have to include the value of bonds in the
Article 1505 calculation for forced heirship purposes? When the Supreme Court
35. 24 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946).
36. 210 La. 1033, 29 So. 2d 53 (1946).
37. La. R.S. 47:2404 (1990).
38. Raborn, 210 La. at 1037-38, 29 So. 2d at 53.
39. This ditinction is brought out in Posner, supra note 16.
40. 607 So. 2d 996 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writs denied, 610 So. 2d 818, 818 (1993).
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said that one of the inducements selected by the Treasury is the survivorship
provision, which is a convenient method of avoiding complicated probate
proceedings, did it intend to permit a forced heir to follow the bonds into the
hands of the co-owner or beneficiary owner with an action for reduction?
CONCLUSION
It is the conclusion of the writer, based upon all of the cases reviewed
above, that Louisiana should join the majority of other states and allow both co-
owner and beneficiary United States savings bonds to move freely into the hands
of the co-owner or beneficiary without any strings attached, except the possible
revocation for fraud. There is no basis for the distinction between Louisiana's
system of forced heirship and Louisiana's system of community property. Either
both or neither should have "strings attached" to the transfer of the bonds.
Furthermore, it is senseless to try to put square pegs into round holes. A co-
owner bond is not a donation inter vivos as we define it in the Civil Code, nor
is a beneficiary bond a mortis causa donation. By adopting the rule of the
majority of other states, we would simply recognize the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. Certainly, this would not please Justice Moise; but,
is there anyone in the present day who still regards the Civil Code as the "Ark
of the Covenant"?
Surely, it will be argued, as it was in Succession of Geagan,4' that we
should not permit one spouse to dispose of the other spouse's share of the
community by a contract with the federal government when he could not do so
by donation inter vivos or mortis causa. Just as surely, those in favor of forced
heirship will contend that such a contract with the federal government should not
be permitted to, cut off the "sacred right" of the forced heir to inherit. Judge
Dore, in Succession of Tanner, suggested we treat United States savings bonds
the same way we treat life insurance. To that, we could now add pension benefit
plans. Why not amend Article 1505 again and provide that co-owner and
beneficiary United States savings bonds are not to be included in the computation
to fix the legitime? Section 2404 of Title 47, Louisiana Revised Statutes, could
similarly be amended to exclude such bonds from Louisiana's inheritance tax.
It is suggested that a much smaller amount of wealth is involved here than in life
insurance and pension benefit plans. Whether we amend or not, it would appear
the United States Supreme Court is likely to apply the Supremacy Clause and
achieve the same result.4"
41. 212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
42. The author acknowledges the tremendous assistance of Joseph S. Parlermo, Jr., Comment,
Donations A Cause de Mort, 37 La. L. Rev. 1071 (1977), and the equally helpful Kenneth D.
McCoy, Jr., Comment, Problems in Classification of Particular Property Under Community Property
Regimes. 25 La. L. Rev. 108 (1964).
1995]

